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CASE COMMENT 
 
Lorna Richardson* 
What do we know about retention now? 
 
 
In J H&W Lamont of Heathfield Farm v Chattisham Ltd1 the Inner House considered the scope and 
limitations of the right to retain contractual performance.  
 
A THE FACTS 
 
The pursuers, a partnership, owned land, over which they had granted an option to the defenders, 
who were developers. The pursuers had granted a standard security over the land in favour of the 
defenders in security of their obligations under the option. The pursuers terminated the option 
agreement. There was no dispute that the option had come to an end.  
 
The pursuers raised an action seeking implement by the defenders of their obligation under the 
option to deliver a discharge of the standard security. The defenders were not prepared to grant a 
discharge, arguing that the pursuers had been in breach of their obligations under the option, which 
were the subject of the defenders’ counterclaim for damages. The defenders asserted a right of 
retention in respect of the obligation to provide a discharge.   
 
B DECISION 
 
At first instance the pursuers were successful.2 The Inner House unanimously refused the defenders’ 
appeal, however, very different reasons were given by each of the judges.  
 
Lord Carloway noted that the remedy of withholding performance is available to a party in an 
ongoing contract where the other party has failed, refused or delayed to perform a reciprocal 
obligation in that contract.3 Retention was not normally available when a contract had come to an 
end. It was intended to compel performance in a subsisting contract. It was not normally available to 
a party who was not seeking performance by the other party, but who was seeking damages for a 
past breach that was unlikely to be repeated.4  
 
He noted that withholding performance was available where the obligation, in respect of which 
performance is being withheld, is the counterpart of the obligation breached. Whether there was 
such interdependence was a matter of contractual interpretation, although, generally, all obligations 
on one side of the contract would normally be seen as reciprocal to those on the other in the 
absence of a clear indication to the contrary.5 The scheme of the parties’ contract was plain. The 
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defenders had a right to oblige the pursuers to sell land to third parties and to share in the proceeds 
of sale. That was the primary obligation to be secured under the option.6 Although there were 
ancillary obligations on the pursuers to assist the sales process, those obligations were not 
enforceable after the option was terminated. Withholding performance could not be used to compel 
performance, even of a reciprocal obligation, when it was no longer extant.7 It was clear that “all 
obligations” secured by the standard security related only to obligations which remained prestable.8  
Lord Carloway noted that, even if it were competent to withhold performance, it was inequitable in 
the circumstances. If the defenders wished security for their damages claim they could apply for 
diligence on the dependence.9 
 
Lord Drummond Young had two reasons for refusing the appeal: firstly, that the pursuers’ obligation 
under the option to grant the security was not the counterpart of the other provisions in the option; 
secondly, that even if the obligation to grant the security was the counterpart of other obligations, it 
was inequitable to permit the defenders to retain performance.10 Lord Drummond Young then made 
a number of general observations about retention.  
 
He noted that contractual retention served as a form of security for contractual performance.11 It 
was a “very flexible form of security, applicable to a great range of obligations in a wide range of 
circumstances.”12 It permitted the withholding or temporary non-performance of the substantive 
obligations under a contract, such as obligations to supply goods, provide services or pay the price.13 
It was important that the right should be confined to substantive obligations. There were dangers of 
extending it more widely to incidental and ancillary obligations. 14  
 
He stated that contractual retention was based on the principle of mutuality of contract, which is 
fundamental to the notion of a bi- or multilateral contract in Scots law. The underlying principle was 
thus that the provisions of the contract are normally taken to be interdependent.15 Lord Drummond 
Young noted that Turnbull v McLean16 made clear that the normal rule of Scots law is that “the 
whole of the obligations on one side of the contract are regarded as counterparts of the whole 
obligations on the other side of the contract.”17 There were obvious practical reasons for that; “a 
contract is negotiated and concluded as a unity, and if it is not implemented and enforced as a unity 
a central and vital part of the parties’ bargain will be lost.”18 He noted that the mutuality of contract 
had been extended beyond the provisions of a single contract, to cover obligations under a related 
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contract.19 The law relating to contracts performed in stages was quite clear from cases such as 
Turnbull v McLean. Lord Drummond Young considered that the speech of Lord Jauncey in Bank of 
East Asia v Scottish Enterprise20 had to be read subject to the well-established existing law and 
should not be construed as suggesting that in instalment contracts the presumption of 
interdependence was in some way reduced.21 If the principle of mutuality were applied in that way 
to contracts to be performed in stages the result would be “nonsensical”.22 Problems would arise in 
contracts to be performed in stages, such as building contracts23  and leases. The practical 
importance of such contracts “hardly required stating” and it would “be most regrettable if the 
doctrine of retention were not to be applied to them, or only to be applied in the restricted manner 
that appears to be contemplated by Lord Jauncey”.24 He went on to note that although the norm 
was that contractual obligations were mutually interdependent, parties could frame their contract in 
such a way that one or more obligations were independent of the others; in that case one party 
could demand performance without tendering performance himself.25 Lord Drummond Young found 
that the defenders’ obligation in the option to discharge the security fell into that category.26 He also 
opined that when an express security is granted, such as a standard security, it could be reasonably 
inferred that the express security was intended to supersede the implied security conferred by 
contractual retention.27  
 
Lord Drummond Young considered the equitable nature of retention to be important.28 As retention 
could be invoked in a wide range of circumstances it was essential that it should not be abused.29 He 
considered an important policy consideration in restricting the doctrine of compensation to liquid 
debts only was the risk that payment of a debt, clearly due and payable, could be resisted because 
the debtor had a claim for damages that was uncertain as to liability or amount. Similar 
considerations applied to retention. Equity would not deny the defence of retention in every case; it 
would depend on the circumstances. The “fundamental point” was that when a damages claim was 
used to support a defence of retention it had to be looked at critically and the court had to 
determine whether it was fair and just that it should be allowed as a defence to a counterpart 
obligation that was clearly defined and clearly due.30 
 
Lord Malcolm considered that the matter could be determined on the basis of construction of the 
parties’ contract. He considered that the terms of the option demonstrated that the parties did not 
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intend the standard security to cover ongoing and outstanding damages claims.31  He then went on 
to consider, obiter, aspects of retention: noting that where stipulations were imposed on parties in a 
bilateral agreement which were conditional on each other, performance of one of them could not be 
demanded by the other party unless that party had performed or was able and willing to perform his 
counterpart obligations. This kind of retention was sometimes called “mutuality retention” and that 
absent the necessary mutuality retention of that type did not arise.32 He noted that in Bank of East 
Asia Lord Jauncey had quoted with approval the comments of Lord Shand in Pegler v Northern 
Agricultural Implement and Foundry Co Ltd that: 
 
I venture to think the sound principle is rather this, that if the defence be founded on an 
obligation fairly arising out of the contract, and the performance of which is reciprocal to 
and contemporaneous (viz. exigible or prestable at the same time) with the obligation which 
is the foundation of the action, then the defence is good.33 
 
Lord Jauncey had commented that Lord Shand “was clearly envisaging not the totality of the 
obligations due under a contract but rather specific obligations which were the direct counterpart of 
the other obligations thereunder”.34 Lord Jauncey had also noted that it was not the case that each 
and every obligation by one party was necessarily the counterpart of every obligation by the other 
and that it was a matter of circumstance.35 It was thus clear that Lord Jauncey had rejected the 
proposition that any claim under a mutual contract could be set against any other claim howsoever 
and whensoever such claim might arise. 36  Counter obligations were “corresponding and 
contemporaneous claims” which had to be “exigible or prestable at the same time.”37 Taking this 
into account, the defenders could not rely on mutuality retention because they were not attempting 
to force the pursuers to perform a contractual duty, let alone one that was the counterpart of the 
defenders’ obligation to discharge the standard security.38 That obligation came into existence only 
on termination of the option and could not therefore be characterised as reciprocal upon any of the 
pursuer’s duties under the contract.39  
 
C CONCLUSIONS 
 
There are a number of problems with this case. A major difficulty is that while the members of the 
bench come to the same decision they analysis retention in very different ways, and, at times, 
contradict each other. The most obvious example is in relation to Lord Jauncey’s comments in Bank 
of East Asia. Lord Drummond Young is highly critical of them, suggesting that they should not be 
construed as suggesting that in instalment contracts the presumption of interdependence is in some 
way reduced; and that applying the principle of mutuality in such a restricted way would be 
“nonsensical”. Yet Lord Malcolm relies on Lord Jauncey’s comments in finding that the parties’ 
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obligations are not counterparts. It is difficult to reconcile the decisions in Turnbull v McLean and 
Bank of East Asia, but it may be noted that the latter was approved by Lord President Rodger in 
Macari v Celtic Football and Athletic Club Ltd 40 and, more recently, by Lord Hope in Inveresk.41 
 
The Lord President notes that the right to retain is generally only available to secure future 
performance, not for past breaches that are unlikely to be repeated. Yet, as has been argued 
elsewhere, there is no conceptual reason for this limitation on the right to retain42 and it conflicts 
with the use of mutuality retention in Inveresk, where the defenders were seeking damages for  
breach on an obligation in the past, which obligation could not now be performed.  
 
It is clear that mutuality retention is subject to equitable control by the courts, however, the scope 
of this control has been described as “undeveloped”.43 Both the Lord President and Lord Drummond 
Young consider the fact that the defenders could seek diligence on the dependence as indicating it 
would be inequitable to allow mutuality retention. This seems misplaced. Any creditor raising 
proceedings has the ability to seek diligence on the dependence. It should not therefore be a reason 
militating against a right of retention. It must be borne in mind that mutuality retention, in contrast 
to special retention, is available as of right unless the court considers its use inequitable. 
 
In this case, as in McNeill, Lord Drummond Young argues that the right to retain only applies in 
respect of substantive obligations, and not incidental contractual obligations. Having to determine 
what is a substantive obligation and what is not, in order to decide whether or not retention is 
available, brings yet further complexity to an already complex area. In some contracts it may be 
difficult for solicitors to determine whether an obligation is substantive or not. This is highly 
undesirable where parties may have to decide this for themselves without the benefit of legal 
advice. This is particularly problematic as retention, as well as being a defence, is a self-help 
remedy.44  
 
In determining that mutuality retention was not available to the defenders, Lord Drummond Young 
noted that the express grant of the standard security reasonably inferred that the implied security 
provided by retention was superseded. There is no reason to suppose that in obtaining an additional 
right by way of an express security, a party gives up his common law rights. This is especially so as 
excluding the common law right to retain is done either by agreement between the parties or where 
exclusion is the necessary implication of the parties’ agreement.45 Lord Drummond Young also draws 
on the narrow ambit of compensation: that it is only available in respect of liquid debts given the risk 
that payment of a debt, clearly due and payable, could be resisted because the debtor had a claim 
for damages. He believed that similar considerations should apply to mutuality retention. Yet there 
are significant differences between compensation and retention, not least of which is that for 
compensation to operate there need be no link between the claims at all beyond the fact that they 
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are both due and payable by the same parties in the same right, so called concursus debiti et crediti. 
There needs to be a close link between obligations for mutuality retention to operate: the claims 
need to be counterparts, and will most often be found within the same contract.  
 
Lord Drummond Young notes that a claim of damages as a basis for retention needs to be 
considered critically to determine whether it is fair and just that it be allowed. It is suggested that 
this puts the test the wrong way round. Mutuality retention is available as of right unless it is 
inequitable to allow it. The question therefore is not whether it is equitable to allow it46 but whether 
there is anything that demonstrates it would be inequitable to allow it.47  
 
Lord Malcolm considers the fact that the defenders’ obligation to grant a discharge only arose on 
termination of the option as a basis for the obligations not being counterparts. He notes that there 
must be contemporaneous claims which are “exigible or prestable” at the same time. This appears 
to conflate two issues: one, whether the obligations are counterparts; and secondly whether the 
claims are contemporaneous. For instance, paying the price is reciprocal to the obligation to deliver 
goods in a contract of sale48 yet the buyer may be granted a period of credit such that he obtains 
delivery of the goods prior to the price being due. The obligations would not, until, payment was due 
be contemporaneous. The requirement that claims be contemporaneous means that B is only able 
to withhold her contractual performance if A has breached a contractual obligation before the date 
on which B would have to perform her obligation under the contract.49 If so, B can then retain. In 
this case the defenders’ counterclaim was based on alleged breaches of the option by the pursuers 
before the option was terminated, which meant that the obligations, while perhaps not 
counterparts, were contemporaneous. 
 
It is perhaps arguable that the terms of the option were enough to demonstrate that all of the 
pursuers’ obligations were not the counterparts of all of the defenders’ obligations such that 
mutuality retention was unavailable. The major difficulty with this case is the diverging comments 
regarding the way in which retention operates and how it ought to be controlled. The case poses 
more questions than it answers about this misunderstood area of law.  
                                                        
46 The test for special retention. 
47 Such as retention being pled simply to delay performance: see Gloag p627; Earl of Galloway v M’Connell 
1911 SC 846.  
48 S28 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.  
49 Redpath Dorman Long Ltd v Cummins Engine Co Ltd 1981 SC 370.  
